The writer is a lecturer at Stanford University and former deputy secretary-general of Nato
The People’s Republic of China is currently on a nuclear tear, building up its arsenal from roughly 500 warheads today to as many as 1,500 by 2035. It is also building up its ability to launch nuclear weapons, with 300 new ballistic missile silos to the north and west of Beijing and new submarines and bombers in the offing. All of these systems will be pointed at the US and its allies.
At the same time, Russia is embroiled in a war of aggression against Ukraine in which it has rattled the nuclear sabre yet again. It is refusing to allow inspections and other implementation measures agreed under the US/Russian nuclear arms reduction treaty New Start, saying that the US and Nato must cease assisting Ukraine before it will consider negotiating. The Kremlin has vowed to stay within the limits of the treaty — 1,550 warheads and 700 missiles and bombers — but it is due to go out of force in 2026.
Both China and Russia are refusing to talk to the US about new controls on strategic nuclear weapons. It is as if the near-apocalyptic experience of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when the Soviet Union and US brought the world to the brink of nuclear war, has disappeared from collective memory.
Pranay Vaddi, special assistant to President Biden for disarmament matters, described these dire circumstances in a speech to the US Arms Control Association in June: “At least in the near term,” he said, “the prospects for strategic arms control are dim . . . Russia and the PRC are failing to meet their international obligations . . . They are forcing the United States and our close allies and partners to prepare for a world where nuclear competition occurs without numerical constraints.” Vaddi wrapped up his speech with the important point that if the president must build up US nuclear forces, she or he will.
Rejuvenating US nuclear capabilities could play a profound role in bringing China and Russia back to the negotiating table. Certainly such moves have had that effect in the past.
The most famous example of this phenomenon is the 1979 “dual-track” decision taken by the US and its Nato allies to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe in order to convey that any nuclear threat from Moscow would be answered. By 1987, a treaty to ban ground-launched intermediate-range missiles had been agreed.
Although this treaty was later abandoned following Russian violations, the example is still trenchant. Sometimes strong action is required so that nuclear competitors know they cannot offer threats without a forceful response.
The US is building up the ability to mount such a response in its current nuclear modernisation programme. It is replacing ageing nuclear missiles, submarines and bombers, some of which had been in deployment since the 1970s — or, in the case of the B-52 bomber, since the 1950s.
Started in 2016, this ‘Program of Record’ is designed to keep US nuclear weapons safe, secure and effective but not to build up the arsenal. Under the current circumstances, however, modernisation does something more: it creates the industrial backbone that will enable the US to increase its nuclear forces if the need arises.
The schedule for replacing each leg of the nuclear triad — land-based missiles, submarines and bombers — is tight. It must be allowed to continue unburdened by new requirements until its completion in the 2035-2045 time period.
Meanwhile, Washington has a window of opportunity to bring Beijing and Moscow to the negotiating table.
It is best to start with the simplest option. When 2026 rolls around, it would be easiest for Moscow and Washington to continue to abide by the limits of the expiring treaty. The two sides should also negotiate to resume on-site inspections — Vladimir Putin himself will have to be convinced that it is in Russia’s national security interest to do so. Perhaps the strengthening of the US nuclear industrial complex can be brought to his attention in a way that makes Russia’s interest in implementing the treaty abundantly clear.
As for the Chinese, if they reach 1,500 warheads by 2035 and continually refuse to talk then the US and its allies must consider a build-up.
Wide-ranging anxiety that we are reaching the end of the road for nuclear arms control is well-founded. Nevertheless, there is time to work the problem through and a responsibility to do so.
The worst-case scenario is that Russia and China are hell-bent on increasing their nuclear holdings at the cost of global stability. If that occurs, the US will be ready and able to respond.
